la Polonia e la dimensione orientale dell’UE
TRANSITIONS ONLINE: Our Take: Poland Was Right
by TOL, 12 September 2008 T
The need is greater than ever for the EU to embrace Warsaw’s Eastern Partnership. — Georgia’s military is a wreck, its economic locomotive derailed, and even a drunken gambler would think twice before wagering on its political future. In Ukraine, the unhappy marriage between the president and prime minister grows more desperate, while the country remains riven over whether it belongs with the East or West.
If this picture from behind the old Iron Curtain isn’t enough to bring on depression, look again. Moldova worries that Russia could launch another “humanitarian intervention” in disputed Transdneister, while voters in Azerbaijan and Belarus will go to the polls in the next few weeks knowing that no change can happen.
This all goes to show that Poland was right. These countries desperately need help, and they need more than diplomatic niceties and crumbs of hope dropped from the banqueting tables of European Union summits.
| Power relations and borders in Russia’s “near abroad” have shifted many times down the centuries. |
Poland, backed by Sweden, this spring proposed an “Eastern Partnership” to provide special attention to the EU’s right flank. The concept essentially shifts the Poles’ longstanding foreign policy of fostering democracy and stability in former Soviet states to a European stage.
The Eastern Partnership got drowsy nods of support from other EU states when it was presented at the EU summit in June, and nearly got lost in the debate over Nicolas Sarkozy’s grandiose plans for a Mediterranean Union for North Africa and the Middle East. Both the French and Polish proposals have been derided in some quarters as an unnecessary repetition of the EU’s neighborhood policy of economic incentives and doses of aid which already applies to many of these countries.
But after the August war in Georgia, Poland’s idea now looks both clever and prescient. It proposes extending free trade and visa-free travel to eastern countries that embrace pluralism, combat corruption and adopt EU values on human rights. The Polish concept also foresees closer cooperation in less politically loaded areas, including transport planning and environmental protection. It would channel more development aid through the European Investment Bank and other lending organizations.
The EU’s reaction to Russia’s aggression in Georgia is more proof that the bloc remains a stoop-shouldered weakling in security matters. The Polish Eastern Partnership, however, mobilizes the EU’s many strengths while minimizing internal opposition. First, unlike the southern union Sarkozy proposed, it does not create another vast bureaucratic structure. Secondly, Polish and Swedish officials were wise to separate closer relations with eastern neighbors from promises of EU membership, thus minimizing destructive debates about whether the Caucasus nations are “European” enough or whether the bloc needs another infusion of corrupt ex-communist states polluting its image. And third, the EU’s Eurobarometer surveys show strong public support for helping eastern countries become more democratic and more stable, particularly Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, which share borders with the EU.
GO WEST — Governments in these countries, particularly Georgia and Ukraine, have all acknowledged that there are big dividends from closer ties to Europe. The EU is Ukraine’s biggest trading partner and business ties are growing every day, and even the Belarusian ruler is taking steps to burnish relations between his Soviet-style state and Brussels.
But it’s not just official policy that is in favor of Europe. Ukrainians are voting with their feet. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development released a study this week showing that Ukrainian migration to the West continues to grow significantly. In Poland and the Czech Republic, two popular destinations, job-seeking Ukrainians comprise the biggest immigrant group.
The Caucasus conflict does complicate the already delicate task of dealing with countries the Kremlin sees as untouchable by outsiders. Moscow fiercely opposes NATO expansion to the regions, and may eventually come to resent EU missionaries proselytizing about democracy and respect for human rights on its frontier. Furthermore, Moscow’s armed intervention in Georgia’s separatist disputes has emboldened ethnic Russian populations and pro-Kremlin factions in Ukraine and Moldova. In Ukraine, governed by a dysfunctional coalition and a Kremlin-friendly opposition, Deputy Prime Minister Hryhoriy Nemyria this week warned that his country’s domestic political turmoil could undermine hopes for closer ties with the EU.
Poland’s partnership offers nothing in the way of guarantees that Moscow will not continue to make life hell for the very neighbors it proclaims to nurture. Poland is right to press for closer trade, economic assistance, and reduced travel restrictions to show that the EU offers a more promising future. With the EU too indecisive to really stand up to Russian belligerence, the least it can do is use its economic and moral power to give its eastern neighbors the opportunities they are not getting from the Kremlin.
Transitions Online encourages readers to respond to this and other commentaries or articles. For information or to read other letters to the editor, see the Letters page. We also invite readers to submit longer, more detailed commentaries. For information, read our submission guidelines.
The Eastern Partnership got drowsy nods of support from other EU states when it was presented at the EU summit in June, and nearly got lost in the debate over Nicolas Sarkozy’s grandiose plans for a Mediterranean Union for North Africa and the Middle East. Both the French and Polish proposals have been derided in some quarters as an unnecessary repetition of the EU’s neighborhood policy of economic incentives and doses of aid which already applies to many of these countries.
But after the August war in Georgia, Poland’s idea now looks both clever and prescient. It proposes extending free trade and visa-free travel to eastern countries that embrace pluralism, combat corruption and adopt EU values on human rights. The Polish concept also foresees closer cooperation in less politically loaded areas, including transport planning and environmental protection. It would channel more development aid through the European Investment Bank and other lending organizations.
The EU’s reaction to Russia’s aggression in Georgia is more proof that the bloc remains a stoop-shouldered weakling in security matters. The Polish Eastern Partnership, however, mobilizes the EU’s many strengths while minimizing internal opposition. First, unlike the southern union Sarkozy proposed, it does not create another vast bureaucratic structure. Secondly, Polish and Swedish officials were wise to separate closer relations with eastern neighbors from promises of EU membership, thus minimizing destructive debates about whether the Caucasus nations are “European” enough or whether the bloc needs another infusion of corrupt ex-communist states polluting its image. And third, the EU’s Eurobarometer surveys show strong public support for helping eastern countries become more democratic and more stable, particularly Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, which share borders with the EU.
GO WEST — Governments in these countries, particularly Georgia and Ukraine, have all acknowledged that there are big dividends from closer ties to Europe. The EU is Ukraine’s biggest trading partner and business ties are growing every day, and even the Belarusian ruler is taking steps to burnish relations between his Soviet-style state and Brussels.
But it’s not just official policy that is in favor of Europe. Ukrainians are voting with their feet. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development released a study this week showing that Ukrainian migration to the West continues to grow significantly. In Poland and the Czech Republic, two popular destinations, job-seeking Ukrainians comprise the biggest immigrant group.
The Caucasus conflict does complicate the already delicate task of dealing with countries the Kremlin sees as untouchable by outsiders. Moscow fiercely opposes NATO expansion to the regions, and may eventually come to resent EU missionaries proselytizing about democracy and respect for human rights on its frontier. Furthermore, Moscow’s armed intervention in Georgia’s separatist disputes has emboldened ethnic Russian populations and pro-Kremlin factions in Ukraine and Moldova. In Ukraine, governed by a dysfunctional coalition and a Kremlin-friendly opposition, Deputy Prime Minister Hryhoriy Nemyria this week warned that his country’s domestic political turmoil could undermine hopes for closer ties with the EU.
Poland’s partnership offers nothing in the way of guarantees that Moscow will not continue to make life hell for the very neighbors it proclaims to nurture. Poland is right to press for closer trade, economic assistance, and reduced travel restrictions to show that the EU offers a more promising future. With the EU too indecisive to really stand up to Russian belligerence, the least it can do is use its economic and moral power to give its eastern neighbors the opportunities they are not getting from the Kremlin.
Transitions Online encourages readers to respond to this and other commentaries or articles. For information or to read other letters to the editor, see the Letters page. We also invite readers to submit longer, more detailed commentaries. For information, read our submission guidelines.
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