Polonia mon amour » polacchi-americani

La Polonia e la sua visione estera: un bilancio

Paolo Morawski — Sun, 06 Mar 2011 15:13:36 +0000

Essay: Russia’s Reset and Central Europe
by Edward Lucas, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), 1 March 2011
CEPA Senior Fellow and International Editor of The Economist Edward Lucas offers an honest assessment of the historic gains achieved by the Polish-Russian rapprochement and the limitations that both it and the improvement in intra-European politics are likely to encounter in the years ahead. Edward Lucas is International Editor of the Economist and a non-resident Fellow at CEPA. He has been covering the Central and East European region since the mid-1980s. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.
——————
Nobody looking at Poland’s relationship with Russia over the past few centuries would counsel policymakers in Warsaw to adopt a sanguine attitude toward the east. From the partitions of Poland in the late 18th century to the crushing of the 1863 uprising against Tsarist autocracy, to the Red Army’s march on the infant Second Republic (foiled by the Miracle of the Vistula in 1920); to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 which divided Poland between the Nazi and Soviet empires; to the Katyń massacre in 1940; and the Soviet-backed imposition of martial law in 1981, the list is so long and tragic that pathological historical trauma seems the normal and inevitable response. Against that background, the “reset” of relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia from 2009 onwards is a remarkable episode in diplomatic history that deserves careful consideration.
…
Against that background, Poland’s reset is startling. It started with the low-key decision in 2007 to set up a joint working group on what were euphemistically described as “difficult historical issues.” Many scoffed at that. How could the Russian list of perceived wrongs (Polish ingratitude for its “liberation” in 1945; resentment at the deaths of Soviet Russian POWs in 1920) be equated with the grotesque crimes of the Stalin era? Yet the scoffers (I was one of them) were wrong. The steady work of historians has done serious good, locating archives, ferreting out facts, nailing down numbers, dates and times. Controversies about interpretation remain, but the outlines of what happened when and to who have never been clearer or less contested.
The next stage in the reset came with Mr. Putin’s visit to Poland’s Baltic coast in 2009, to mark the anniversary of the 1939 Nazi attack, where he came close to apologizing for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Again, for many people it did not go far enough. The Russian leader portrayed it as a bad mistake, not a hideous crime; he put it in context, misleadingly, with other deals done by other countries (such as the Franco-British betrayal of Czechoslovakia).
But that visit set the scene for another: the joint commemoration by Mr. Putin and Mr. Tusk of the 70th anniversary of the Katyń massacre. To see Mr. Putin kneeling in sorrow at the memorial was striking. So was the fact that a film about the massacre, by Poland’s greatest film director, Andrzej Wajda, was shown on Russian television. But it was still possible to quibble. Mr. Putin raised the hoary and misleading comparison between the fate of Russian POWs in Poland after 1920 (whose deaths were tragic, but not the result of mass murder) and the fate of the Polish nation, killed on the direct orders of the Soviet leadership.
Truly remarkable, though, was the reaction to the tragic plane crash of April 2010 in Russia, which killed President Lech Kaczyński and dozens of senior Polish officials. Mr. Putin, visibly moved, publicly consoled Mr. Tusk, saying that the investigation would leave no stone unturned and take place under his personal charge. Andrzej Wajda’s film was rebroadcast, this time not on a minority cultural channel, but at prime time on one of the most-watched stations in Russia.
Those wanting to nitpick could still find an infestation. Russia has not exactly apologized unconditionally to Poland for past Soviet crimes. (It is a little as if modern Germany would grudgingly admit that the Holocaust happened and that the Third Reich was responsible, while keeping the Auschwitz archives secret and refusing to pay compensation to those murdered there.) Russia still contests a lawsuit at Strasbourg in which the relatives of those killed at Katyń are seeking justice. Other historical loose ends abound.
Yet that was not the issue. The political climate changed to the point that the differing interpretations of history (to put it politely) became a peripheral political problem, rather than a metaphor for the entire relationship. This is a huge shift. Under previous Polish governments, the past overshadowed the present. Every development in Russia was seen through a lens of revanchist, neo-Soviet and threatening behavior. Poland’s own strengths were underestimated; Russia’s profound weaknesses were ignored.
What has changed is first and foremost perceptions on the Polish side. It may be a surprise to Polonocentric commentators, but Russians do not wake up in the morning thinking about Polish history. Self-absorption is a constant feature of Russian political thinking, as is an almost willful blindness to “small” countries (in fact Poland’s population is nearly 40 million, but for a country of 140 million and the world’s largest land mass, that is still small). Russians do bristle about countries such as Georgia and Estonia when they are seen as “provoking” Russia. They will get cross about Ukraine if it “steals” Russian gas. But given the chance, most Russians (and most Russian politicians) would prefer not to think about places like Poland, any more than Americans would expect to spend a lot of time worrying about Mexican politics or foreign policy. Russia has plenty of problems of its own.
In Poland, it was the other way round. Every Pole has an opinion about Russia, usually a negative one. That creates fertile ground for sincere and mischief-making politicians alike. The genius of the Tusk-Sikorski approach to Polish foreign policy is that the two men have stopped playing to the gallery and started thinking about the real Polish national interest. It cannot possibly be in Poland’s interest to have bad relations with all its immediate neighbors (and arguably not with any of them). It is particularly perverse to pick fights with both your important neighbors, while relying on support from faraway countries such as the United States or even from Britain (“been there, done that,” Poles might say bitterly to that idea). The quality and quantity of attention that Poland can expect in Washington is not commensurate with Poland’s need for external support, especially if it is on icy terms with both Berlin and Moscow. That was the dead-end into which the previous government of Jarosław Kaczyński had backed the country.
Poland was (at least in its own eyes) heroic. It was a super-loyal ally in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its secret service cooperated gladly with the CIA in extraordinary rendition programs and other counter-terrorist operations. It campaigned vigorously for Ukrainian and Georgian membership of NATO, for Lithuania, and for human rights and political freedoms in Belarus. But it was also marginalized.
For Germany, France and other big European countries, Warsaw was simply not to be taken seriously. This was a government which issued diplomatic protests in response to unfavorable media coverage (a no-no in the European Union, or between countries anywhere that regard a free press as an essential part of the legal and constitutional order). Even Washington hawks under the George W. Bush Administration winced at the incompetence, muddled priorities and unrealistic expectations coming from their chief East European ally. One official compared Poland in this era (on deep background, and I am quoting from memory) to a beloved but ill-trained dog. “I love it to bits,” he said. “But it messes on the carpet, annoys the neighbors, barks all the time, licks my face when I am trying to work and begs for food.”
Since the reset, Poland looks different. Not only does it not pick fights, bark and whine, but it helps solve problems rather than creating them. Perhaps the biggest dividend of the reset has been in relations with Germany. Never in Poland’s history have these been better. Instead of a paranoid, prickly stance there are warm words on both sides. When Radosław Sikorski wanted to deliver a tough message to the regime in Belarus before the December elections, he traveled there alongside his German counterpart, Guido Westerwelle. Mr. Tusk has excellent relations with the German chancellor, the avowed Polonophile Angela Merkel. (With Russia, the personal chemistry, such as it is, chiefly exists between Mr. Tusk and Mr. Putin; Mr. Sikorski and his counterpart Sergei Lavrov have a relationship that could be described as verging on the cordial.)
From Germany’s point of view, Poland is now Salonfähig [suitable for the parlor]. The powerful pro-Russia lobby in Germany cannot object to good ties with Poland when Russia itself does not. Poland still has issues with Germany (it would like the Polish minority in Germany to have the same sort of schooling that ethnic Germans have in Poland; and it is still bothered, a little, by the revanchist rhetoric of some bits of Mrs. Merkel’s conservative Christian Democrat Union).
In several senses, Poland is something of an outlier. Other countries did not have such bad relations with Germany in the first place (Mr. Kaczyński seemed to regard Germany as, in essence, just as big a threat as Russia). But none of the others has cozied up to Russia to the same extent either.
…
That, incidentally, reflects a big and often misunderstood point about Russia’s role in the region. Compared to any individual country in the newish members of the EU, Russia indeed looks like a superpower; compared to the EU as a whole, Russia looks puny in everything except its nuclear arsenal. The Kremlin can cause great mischief in, say, Georgia, or in Ukraine, or in Latvia. But it is in no position to pick a fight with the EU as a whole. This does not mean that the former captive nations can rely on a united EU policy toward Russia. But it does mean that Russia approaches its relations with the EU from a position of fundamental weakness.
Against this background, how should Poland’s distinctive and remarkable “reset” be interpreted? Many quite reasonably welcome the calm and cordial tone that now reigns between Moscow and Warsaw. Simply having one less problem to worry about is in itself welcome news. But the point of diplomacy is not to have good relations and keep things calm. It is to get things done and to further the national interest. A secondary but important issue is to protect the interests of allies. Here the ledger as written by the Polish government looks a bit different. Just as with its domestic policy (which I once described in The Economist as “Looking nice and doing nothing”), the presentation of foreign policy rather notably exceeds its practical achievements.
Start with Germany. There is no doubt that Germany takes Poland seriously (it exports and imports three times more with Poland than it does with Russia). It goes along with Polish wishes on Belarus. It has agreed to contingency plans in NATO which involve German troops dying to defend Poland from a (highly unlikely) Russian military attack. Yet Germany still values its relationship with Russia. Germany drags its feet on issues such as Georgia and the CFE treaty. It shows absolutely no desire to speed up Ukraine’s EU or NATO integration. It is lukewarm on Atlanticist issues such as the mission in Afghanistan. Only this year is it finally opening its labor market to workers from “new” member states such as Poland — something that Britain, for example, did in 2004.
It does not like the idea of liberalizing services within the EU, which would create booming business for the newish member states, with their energetic, flexible, multilingual workforces. Germany is still closely tied to the Russian energy agenda, having pushed ahead with the North Stream pipeline on the Baltic seabed, despite vigorous Polish objections. In short: Germany is polite and friendly, but it is not an ally for Poland in the sense that it sacrifices its own important interests to suit Poland.
The same is even starker in the case of Russia. True: the difficulties have been smoothed over. Trade is booming, meaning jobs, wages and investment. Poland is nowhere near the level of trade with Russia that would create economic dependency: Indeed with a planned Liquefied Natural Gas terminal, and the likely development of shale gas reserves, it is further reducing its dependence on Russia’s most important export. Russia understands that it cannot pick on Poland without picking a fight with the whole EU. And with the sensible Mr. Tusk in charge, the EU will be far keener to come to Poland’s aid if Russia does start getting nasty.
Those are welcome developments. But Russia has not inconvenienced itself in the slightest to help Poland. The investigation of the Smolensk plane crash was slovenly and slow. That stoked conspiracy theories and made life unnecessarily difficult for Mr. Tusk. Many Poles take the puzzling loose ends that surround any big news event and knit them into a web of intrigue and murderous intent: Why was the most modern landing system not in place? Why are accounts of the time of the crash inconsistent? Where did the mysterious fog come from? Why have the Russian air traffic controllers responsible disappeared from view? Why does the official Russian report put all blame on the Polish side and none on Russian negligence and incompetence? The answers are fairly simple. The plane was indeed late and its occupants in a hurry. The pilots were under pressure to get their cargo of VIPs to the right place at the right time. They made a bad decision to land in adverse conditions, approaching the airport at too low an altitude. And a tall tree, in just the wrong place at the wrong time, caught the wing of the presidential plane, giving the crew no chance to make an emergency ascent. Conspiratorial Poles believe that the Russians are capable of a great deal, but even they would not credit them with that crucial, fatal tree.
But the Russian side has made it harder for Mr. Tusk to rebut the conspiracy theorists. The news that the electronic devices (mobile phones, laptops etc.) belonging to the dead VIPs had been tampered with before being returned suggested a mean-spirited nosiness from the Russian security services. Delays and unanswered questions fueled the feeling that something was amiss. Yet the truth is that the investigation proceeded just like most things in Russian officialdom: slowly, secretively and with little thought for the public interest.
Russia also shows no great urgency in tying up the remaining loose ends of the “difficult historical issues.” That may change, perhaps in time to help Mr. Tusk win re-election this fall. But so far it looks as though Russia is toying with Poland: having hooked it into a relationship where failure would be politically damaging and some sign of success is essential, it is now showing a mean and manipulative approach. Few on the Polish side have any great illusions about their new Russian friends.
Indeed it would be hard to argue that the polite friendliness on an official level, and a handful of warm personal ties between senior figures, represents a real change toward a positive, dynamic cooperation of the kind that Poland enjoys with, say, Sweden. The “reset” does not have the depth or scope of America’s attempt to restore relations with Russia: Poland does not have close military-to-military ties. Indeed Russia has apparently decided to keep tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad exclave which borders Poland. Nor do the two countries have a formal human rights dialogue, of the kind doggedly pursued by Michael McFaul at the National Security Council, with his Russian counterpart Vladislav Surkov.
Both the American and Polish “resets” have similar advantages. They have defused a problematic relationship, giving politicians room to maneuver and freeing time to concentrate on more pressing problems. They both, however, have a similar downside. They remove pressure on Russia on human rights and neighborhood issues. They risk leaving smaller countries, and opposition leaders inside Russia, feeling marginalized and exposed. They abdicate the moral and strategic high ground in favor of a pragmatic, results-oriented approach. That may be what voters want; politicians cannot be blamed too much for concentrating on compelling problems and trying to sideline what look like peripheral questions. But it is worth spelling out some of the dangers of the Polish reset in particular.
The missing element in Poland’s approach is reassurance. In the wake of America’s botched reset, when it announced a shift in its missile defense plans on the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland, the Obama Administration realized it had to do a much better job in communicating with and calming new member states through NATO (overcoming German objections, while allowing Berlin to take credit for the shift). It has backed those plans with military exercises in the Baltic on an unprecedented scale, with more planned this year (Amber Hope) and next (Steadfast Jazz). U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is seen as a staunch supporter of the region (even though her diplomats sometimes show a more Russia-focused approach). America sends top officials to conferences (a recent security conference in Lithuania had notably high-level input from the NSC, the State Department and elsewhere in government, with participants crossing the Atlantic just for that purpose). President Barack Obama even found time to phone the Latvian Prime Minister, Valdis Dombrovskis, to congratulate him on his election victory last year. Latvia and Lithuania’s combined population is not quite six million.
The impression created by Poland is a bit different. A cable posted on Wikileaks reveals that Poland objected to the NATO decision to extend contingency plans to the Baltic States: The fear, apparently, was that stretching the plans north-eastward would make them less credible. Poland shows no great interest in improving road, rail and power links with the Baltic States. It has allowed essential trivial issues concerning school curriculum, property restitution and the precise use of Polish letters such as “ł” in official documents to jinx its relations with Lithuania. Mr. Sikorski has stated that he will not travel to Lithuania until Poland’s demands are met. Many in Latvia and Estonia find that approach petulant and self-indulgent. Their countries are suffering as a result.
To be fair, Poland has given new weight to the previously moribund Visegrád Group (which also includes the Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians). Poland now sees it as a useful Central European caucus within the EU. Poland’s ties with the Czech Republic are excellent, and cooperation with Hungary on the rotating six-month presidency of the EU (held by Hungary now and Poland from July) has been smooth. Poland has also tried hard to engage the regime in Belarus. When that failed, amid the unexpected crackdown after the December elections, Poland has lobbied hard, and paid generously, to help the Belarusian opposition.
Yet the scent of pragmatism still lingers. Poland did nothing to support pro-democracy demonstrators in Kaliningrad when they were jailed and beaten last year. It is mostly silent on human rights abuses in Russia (though it has said it will support a visa ban for those involved in the torture-killing of Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer). It has not made a fuss about France’s decision to sell Mistral-class warships to Russia and has largely given up trying to help Georgia.
All that is justifiable in the short term. It would be unfair to expect Poland to lead a cavalry charge against Russian tanks, especially when most other EU countries (and America) have shown themselves willing to make deals with the criminal regime in the Kremlin. Yet the fact remains that, unchecked, Russia is a malignant force in the region. It runs a well-financed psychological warfare effort against the Baltic States and Finland. Its penetration of EU decision-making structures is striking and alarming. The weakness displayed by both bodies in response to the Georgia war should be cause for deep alarm. Just because Russia is weak and declining does not mean that it is not dangerous (and indeed a future regime might well find it attractive to stoke confrontation with a neighbor precisely in order to rally public opinion and distract from the miserable mess at home).
The best way to deal with Russia is for the countries of the EU and NATO to present as united a front as possible. Failure to do that plays into the hands of the brutal and kleptocratic regime in the Kremlin, which retains designs on its old empire. That imperative places a particular responsibility on big countries to show that relationships with the Kremlin do not come at the expense of smaller or weaker countries. America has done that. So, since Angela Merkel came to office, has Germany. Poland still needs to follow their example. LEGGI TUTTO.

pdf

Share/Save

Addio allo scudo

Paolo Morawski — Thu, 17 Sep 2009 10:25:58 +0000

Secondo il THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Stati Uniti, gli Stati Uniti potrebbero rinunciare allo scudo antimissile in Europa orientale ovvero al piano dell’amministrazione Bush di costruire un sistema nazionale di difesa antimissile in Polonia e in Repubblica Ceca. La Casa Bianca non ritiene necessaria la presenza dello scudo antimissile perché il programma di missili a lunga gittata iraniano non è in stato avanzato e non rappresenta una minaccia né per gli Stati Uniti, né per le capitali europee.
————–
Varsavia non capisce
ENZO BETTIZA, La Stampa 18/9/2009
Barack Obama ha bocciato uno dei progetti strategici e politici più controversi del predecessore George W. Bush.
Opponendosi al dispiegamento delle basi per uno scudo spaziale in Europa centrorientale, il Presidente darà inevitabilmente la stura all’intreccio di consensi e dissensi di varia natura e diversa intensità sia all’Ovest sia all’Est.
Piacerà anzitutto al Cremlino, da sempre avverso all’eccessivo avvicinamento delle postazioni occidentali ai confini russi: in particolare, l’installazione nei territori ceco e polacco di batterie e di radar antimissile americani veniva considerata a Mosca, con qualche ragione, come una minaccia all’arsenale nucleare e quindi alla sicurezza militare della Russia. La tesi avanzata a suo tempo da Bush, secondo cui il progetto non avrebbe avuto un carattere offensivo contro la Russia, bensì dissuasivo contro i potenziali missili intercontinentali del lontano Iran, sembrava a molti una scusa cervellotica poco credibile. Ora l’amministrazione Obama ha trovato anch’essa, non si sa con quanta credibilità agli occhi dell’opinione conservatrice del Congresso, una sorta di controscusa tecnica e diplomatica: dai rapporti della Cia risulterebbe che l’Iran starebbe mirando solo alla costruzione di missili a corto e medio raggio, incapaci di raggiungere gli Stati Uniti e le capitali europee.
Il brusco dietrofront rispetto allo scudo in Polonia e in Repubblica Ceca è un’ulteriore tessera che egli inserisce nel mosaico già fitto delle inversioni e correzioni spesso demolitrici delle politiche di Bush. Probabile o improbabile che sia l’ipotesi d’intelligence sul ritardo estensivo degli armamenti atomici di Teheran, Obama dà l’impressione di voler scavalcare il dilemma tecnologico per attenersi strettamente alla strategia della mano tesa verso due Paesi, l’Iran di Ahmadinejad e la Russia di Putin, che da un pezzo si oppongono e contestano con crescente asprezza l’America. Insomma, accantonando il progetto Bush, Obama forse spera di poter cogliere con una fava vistosa due insidiosi sparvieri d’Oriente.
Però il gioco al rilancio positivo presenta qualche preoccupante risvolto negativo. Già il Wall Street Journal, che ha lanciato per primo la notizia, sottolinea che la manovra di Washington sarà «prevedibilmente destinata a placare la Russia ma, anche, a inasprire il dibattito sulla sicurezza in Europa». Ufficialmente il segretario generale della Nato Rasmussen, che interpreta peraltro il condiscendente parere di circoli politici euroccidentali, si è affrettato ad annunciare che il congedo dal piano Bush è un fatto in armonia con «l’indivisibilità della sicurezza di tutti gli alleati». Ma non è così. Non proprio tutti gli alleati atlantici – in particolare quelli dell’Est più coinvolti nell’installazione dello scudo, più vicini alla Russia, più esposti ai ricatti petroliferi e politici russi, ancora memori dei soprusi patiti sotto il giogo sovietico – la pensano come Rasmussen.
Voci sibilline si sono già levate dal ministero degli Esteri di Praga, dove per ora il riserbo sul passo di Obama prevale nettamente sull’applauso. Altre voci, invece più acute, storicamente più autorevoli, nazionalmente più critiche, stanno già alzandosi dalla Polonia che, insieme con la Repubblica Ceca, avrebbe dovuto e probabilmente desiderato ospitare le infrastrutture più cospicue dello scudo statunitense. Da Varsavia l’ex presidente polacco Lech Walesa, mitico leader di Solidarnosc e Nobel per la Pace, interpretando il disagio di tanti compatrioti, ha attaccato con ruvida energia la decisione di Obama invitando la Polonia a rivedere dalle fondamenta i suoi rapporti con gli Stati Uniti. Non v’è dubbio che molti polacchi, euroscettici e ultrapatrioti, avevano fino a ieri dello scudo americano una visione agli antipodi di quella di molti russi: se a Mosca lo percepivano come un latente strumento di offesa, a Varsavia per contro lo sentivano e lo aspettavano come una corazza difensiva.
Non si dimentichi che la Polonia è il più importante degli acquisti orientali dell’Occidente. Quaranta milioni di abitanti, una minoranza di circa sette milioni elettoralmente influenti in America, una Chiesa potente, un’economia in moto nonostante la crisi, un’industria automobilistica (Fiat, Volkswagen, Peugeot) all’avanguardia nell’Europa centrorientale. È la terra di dislocazione di servizi di altre grandi imprese come Philips e Lufthansa. Dai tempi del crollo del Muro di Berlino, il cui ventennale si festeggerà anche a Varsavia, i polacchi hanno sempre avuto nell’America, a prescindere dai presidenti americani, un saldo punto di riferimento, spesso in contrasto con le tendenze politiche e psicologiche degli europei occidentali.
Oggi Obama, volendo «placare» i russi, rischia di alienarsi la simpatia e l’appoggio della nazione più incisiva della nuova Europa, per la quale ricorre non solo l’anniversario liberatorio della caduta del comunismo nei Paesi ex satelliti. La ricorrenza indimenticabile, fra le più tragiche della sua storia, è quella dei settant’anni passati dal 1939, quando la loro patria venne aggredita frontalmente dai tedeschi, e assalita subdolamente alle spalle dai russi. Non sappiamo bene a cosa avrebbe potuto servire in uno scenario strategico reale lo scudo di Bush. Comprendiamo che potesse irritare i russi come un’ipotesi di minaccia. Ma comprendiamo, altresì, che dopo la spartizione della Polonia fra tedeschi e russi, e dopo le fosse di Katyn, la memoria storica potesse portare numerosi polacchi a vedere nello scudo, se non altro in chiave psicologica, almeno un simbolo di difesa.
Il rischio è che le due Europe si dividano sul tema del difficile rapporto con la Russia e, contemporaneamente, su quello ambiguo con gli Stati Uniti. Il massimo che Obama potrebbe fare, dopo l’annuncio clamoroso, è di trattare la cancellazione dello scudo non come un negoziato bilaterale tra americani e russi, ma come una proposta da discutere assieme a tutti gli alleati europei della Nato. Non esclusi, naturalmente, quelli dell’Est, i più turbati e più interessati alla questione.

pdf

Share/Save

Usa-Polonia: giù

Paolo Morawski — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 12:39:23 +0000

The US neglects Poland
The conservative daily Rzeczpospolita complains that the US is not sending a high-level representative to the celebrations commemorating the outbreak of World War II: “[The Polish] general Daniel Ambroziński left his life in Afghanistan when he fought alongside the American allies. … Together with the US army we participated in the invasion of Iraq. And although it put a huge strain on our relations with Germany and France, and despite the criticism of the European media and the loss of lives we remained active as long as possible on the Euphrates. How many more American operations must we take part in for someone from the White House to bring themselves to travel to Gdansk on September 1? … What can we do in the next five days to make [US President] Barack Obama and [US Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton understand how badly this is affecting their image in Polish eyes?” (27/08/2009) — Ameryko, co jeszcze możemy zrobić? , Ilu jeszcze polskich oficerów powinno zginąć, by Waszyngton wydelegował na Westerplatte polityka wysokiego szczebla? – pyta Marek Magierowski » , Kapitan Daniel Ambroziński stracił życie w Afganistanie, walcząc u boku amerykańskich sojuszników. Polska nie odstąpiła od Stanów Zjednoczonych ani o krok w walce z talibami i ze światowym terroryzmem. Ilu jeszcze polskich oficerów powinno zginąć w Ghazni, by 1 września, w 70. rocznicę wybuchu II wojny światowej, Waszyngton wydelegował na Westerplatte polityka wysokiego szczebla?
———–
Prawo Obamy, prawo Polski
Stosunki Polski z USA są najgorsze od 1989 roku. To zdanie powtarzane od pewnego czasu przez polskich komentatorów stało się, niestety, jeszcze trafniejsze w przededniu rocznicy wybuchu II wojny światowej, Bartosz Węglarczyk GW 2009-08-27 – Rozumiem powody, jakimi kieruje się rząd USA, rezygnując z tarczy w Polsce. Barack Obama piecze w ten sposób trzy pieczenie przy jednym ogniu. W dobie kryzysu oszczędza bardzo dużo pieniędzy, naprawia stosunki z Rosją i zadowala swych zwolenników, coraz głośniej wyrażających oburzenie zbyt wolnym ich zdaniem odrzucaniem spuścizny po George’u Bushu.
Niestety, decyzje o tarczy zapadają bez nas i poza nami. Wszystko wskazuje na to, że priorytety polityki zagranicznej USA za rządów nowego prezydenta nie obejmują Europy Środkowej. Rezygnacja z planów budowy bazy w Polsce to realny znak, że w oczach Białego Domu przestajemy się liczyć.
Amerykańska delegacja niskiego szczebla stojąca na Westerplatte obok kanclerz Niemiec oraz kilkudziesięciu premierów i ministrów, w tym z Rosji, Wlk. Brytanii czy Francji, to znak symboliczny, że Ameryka przestała przywiązywać wagę do stosunków z Warszawą. W dyplomacji symbole są bowiem kluczowe, a skład delegacji jest właśnie potężnym symbolem.
Autorzy niedawnego listu otwartego byłych przywódców Europy Środkowej do prezydenta Obamy mieli rację – obecna administracja USA zapomniała o naszej części świata. Świętym prawem prezydenta Baracka Obamy i sekretarz stanu USA Hillary Clinton jest dowolne wyznaczanie priorytetów amerykańskiej polityki zagranicznej. Naszym prawem jest jednak mówić, że lekceważenie Europy Środkowej to poważny błąd, który już dziś osłabia sojusz Warszawy z Waszyngtonem, a kiedyś wróci rykoszetem do Białego Domu.
————-
Rezygnacja z tarczy w Polsce to cios i dla was, i dla nas
Rozmawiał w Waszyngtonie Marcin Bosacki, GW 2009-08-27
————-
Polska bez tarczy
Marcin Bosacki, Waszyngton GW 2009-08-27
Porzucenie przez USA planów budowy tarczy antyrakietowej w Polsce i Czechach jest praktycznie przesądzone – twierdzą nasze źródła w Waszyngtonie

pdf

Share/Save