Polonia mon amour » popoli russi-ucraini

Quello che si chiama avere una strategia (russa)

Paolo Morawski — Mon, 07 Jun 2010 15:52:35 +0000

UCRAINA, provincia di Mosca?
Dopo la fusione tra Naftogaz e Gazprom, dopo l’unificazione di aeronautica ed energia nucleare, dopo aver concesso ab aeternum l’uso del porto di Sebastopoli -dove è attraccata la flotta dell’Armata Rossa, l’annessione tra Ucraina e Russia prosegue con l’avvicinamento dei due eserciti. Non una vera e propria unificazione: il Cremlino si limiterà a fornire la logistica ma si è già parlato di progetti congiunti con le aziende russe in campo militare (soprattutto per quanto riguarda l’aviazione), di nuove forniture e di aggiornamenti del materiale esistente, tali da rafforzare considerevolmente l’interdipendenza dei due apparati difensivi. leggi tutto su EaST Journal.

BIELORUSSIA, provincia di Mosca?
Il Presidente bielorusso Alexandre Loukachenko ha dichiarato che si appresta a cedere a Mosca il controllo totale dei gasdotti della compagnia nazionale Beltransgaz. In cambio otterrà la fornitura di gas russo a tariffe inferiori a quelle di mercato. Allo stesso modo Loukachenko cederà le raffineria bielorusse in cambio della fornitura di petrolio detassato. Mosca ha reagito favorevolmente alle proposte di Minsk. Nel 2007 Gazprom aveva già acquisito il 50% di Beltransgaz. Così il Cremlino accetta a braccia aperte le profferte dei Paesi limitrofi, redenti della lontanza che ebbero voluto mettere con la grande madre Russia. Oggi Mosca raccoglie nuovamente intorno a sé i Paesi dell’area: una Bielorussia senza alternative, un’Ucraina tornata come il figliol prodigo. Kiev, dopo aver ceduto i propri gasdotti, l’areonautica, l’energia, si prepara a unificare anche l’esercito. La strategia del Cremlino è stata efficace: isolare i Paesi delle “rivoluzioni colorate”, impedire agli Stati Uniti qualsiasi intromissione nell’orto di casa russo, affamare le popolazioni stringendole nella morsa della più nera recessione, in modo da proporsi come sola alternativa possibile allo sfacelo. Dopo Kiev e Bishkek, anche Minsk comincia a cedere, e presto sarà il turno di Tblisi. Leggi tutto su EaST Journal

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La “correlazione delle forze” a est dell’UE

Paolo Morawski — Fri, 04 Jun 2010 20:14:51 +0000

INVITO — L’Ucraina, la Russia e la Realpolitik europea
Mercoledi 9 giugno 2010, alle 17,30, a Trento, nella Sala degli Affreschi della Biblioteca comunale (Via Roma 55) il Centro Studi sulla Storia dell’Europa Orientale organizza l’incontro-dibattito: L’Ucraina, la Russia e la Realpolitik europea.
Interviene Oxana Pachlovska. Introduce Fernando Orlandi.
Le elezioni presidenziali dello scorso febbraio hanno cambiato decisamente la scena politica dell’Ucraina, facendo oggi sembrare la rivoluzione arancione un episodio appartenente a una epoca decisamente remota.
La vittoria di Viktor Yanukovych ha, per impiegare un’espressione dell’epoca sovietica, ha decisamente mutato la “correlazione delle forze” ai confini orientali dell’Unione Europea.
Mosca ha indubbiamente conseguito una serie di successi. In violazione dell’articolo 17 della Costituzione (che vieta la presenza di basi militari straniere sul suolo dell’Ucraina), il 21 aprile Yanukovych ha siglato con l’omologo russo Dmitrii Medvedev un accordo in base al quale la Flotta russa del Mar Nero resterà nella base di Sebastopoli fino al 2042. Medvedev si è affrettato a rendere noto che la flotta russa sarà anche ammodernata.
Qualche giorno dopo, il 26 aprile, nell’imminenza della frettolosa ratifica dell’accordo alla Rada, il parlamento ucraino, il primo ministro Vladimir Putin ha fatto tappa a Kiev, quasi un monito a rispettare gli accordi presi in passato: sconto sul gas in cambio della base navale.
Il giorno dopo in parlamento è esplosa violenta la rissa (le immagini sono state diffuse anche dalle reti televisive italiane), ma con un margine risicato (236 sì su 450 deputati) l’accordo è stato ratificato. Putin si è indignato per la contestazione e ha aggiunto che il prezzo pagato dalla Russia è stato fin troppo alto (lo sconto sul gas): “Per una somma simile potrei mangiarmi il vostro presidente e il vostro primo ministro” – battuta che rende bene l’idea di come siano mutate le cose nel giro di qualche mese.
Questa mattina, un altro voto della Rada (253 sì) ha cancellato l’associazione alla Nato dagli obiettivi della politica estera di Kiev. Nel documento approvato, l’Ucraina è definita un paese non allineato intenzionato ad aderire all’UE.
Lo scorso mese Putin ha reso noto l’offerta fatta all’Ucraina da Gazprom di unificazione dei sistemi energetici dei due paesi, offerta respinta da Yanukovych il 14 maggio. Lo stesso giorno la BBC informava sulla disponibilità dell’Ucraina a ricevere investimenti occidentali nello stesso settore. Si tratta di una opportunità interessante. Saranno in grado di avvantaggiarsene le società e le istituzioni europee? A vedere dalla lentezza con cui reagisce l’Unione Europea, non sembra ci sia molto da attendersi. Yanukovych ha dichiarato il suo interesse ad accedere all’UE, ma da Bruxelles, invece di proposte concrete, di una road map, sono venute solo offerte di colloqui.
Negli ultimi mesi, invece, Bruxelles sta reagendo con una particolare prontezza verso Mosca. Si è appena concluso a Rostov sul Don il vertice UE-Russia. Negli incontri preparatori i funzionari e i diplomatici europei sono stati particolarmente “discreti”, premurandosi di non sollevare le questioni ritenute “irritanti” da Mosca: violazione dei diritti umani, la situazione nel Caucaso del nord, il promesso ritiro delle truppe russe dalla Trasnistria, e la Georgia.
Il successo del vertice di Rostov starebbe nella nuova partnership modernizzatrice fra Russia e UE. Ma ognuna delle due parti intende la cosa a proprio modo: per l’UE, la modernizzazione dovrebbe costituire il percorso che conduce la Russia a intraprendere riforme economiche strutturali, fondate su principi di mercato. Per la Russia, invece, sembra essere un modo per ottenere tecnologia occidentale al fine di realizzare i propri obiettivi. Con questi presupposti, la partnership potrebbe non essere reciprocamente vantaggiosa.
Ma questo rapporto particolare con Mosca testimonia l’esistenza di una politica di due pesi e due misure nei confronti di paesi che fanno parte della Parnership orientale, per i quali è obbligatorio intraprendere riforme: sarebbe indubbiamente un problema e una ingiustizia se Mosca, ad esempio, ottenesse prima di altri l’esenzione dai visti.
In questo contesto, il 31 maggio si è appreso che stanno per essere aboliti i posti di rappresentante speciale dell’UE per la Moldova (Kalman Mizsei) e il Caucaso meridionale (Peter Semneby). Sono territori particolari, dove si trovano i cosiddetti “conflitti congelati” e dove la presenza russa costituisce un problema. La ratio addotta per questa scelta non tiene: in una lettera Catherine Ashton ha spiegato che si è deciso di eliminare i posti geograficamente più lontani. Ma indubbiamenente l’Asia centrale e la regione dei Grandi laghi in Africa sono geograficamente assai più lontani, e non sono stati toccati.
Forse non è stato un caso che questa notizia sia stata fatta circolare mentre i rappresentanti dell’UE e della Russia si incontravano a Rostov. La nuova Realpolitik che sembra germogliare fra Bruxelles e Mosca quali conseguenze avrà per i paesi confinanti a est con l’UE e più in generale verso gli stati ora indipendenti che un tempo facevano parte dell’Unione Sovietica?
Soprattutto, quale sarà il destino dell’Ucraina?
Questi sono alcuni dei temi di cui si discuterà nel corso dell’incontro-dibattito con Oxana Pachlovska, organizzato dal Centro Studi sulla Storia dell’Europa Orientale, che si svolgerà a Trento mercoledi 9 giugno 2010, alle 17,30, nella Sala degli Affreschi della Biblioteca comunale (Via Roma 55).
L’iniziativa è realizzata con il contributo della Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Trento e Rovereto.
Oxana Pachlovska è italianista in Ucraina e ucrainista in Italia. Svolge attività scientifica presso l’Istituto di di letteratura dell’Accademia nazionale ucraina delle scienze (Kiev) e insegna Ucrainistica presso l’Università di Roma “La Sapienza”. Al suo molte pubblicazioni in varie lingue, fra cui l’imponente Civiltà letteraria ucraina (Carocci).

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Mosca molla in Polonia e avanza in Ucraina?

Paolo Morawski — Wed, 28 Apr 2010 10:01:31 +0000

- finlandizzazione dell’Ucraina? Ukraina – na własne życzenie – może się upodobnić do sąsiedniej Białorusi. Gospodarczo jest ona tak zależna od Rosji, do tego stopnia przyjęła rosyjskie standardy, że nie może wybić się na pełną samodzielność. Nie wiadomo, czy Ukraina jest od wczoraj sfinlandyzowana. Ale na pewno wykonała krok w tę stronę + Suwerenność Ukrainy oddana za 90 dolarów
- L’accordo fissa lo status quo o è già una virata verso est? (si chiede la stampa polacca). Nei commenti si tratta solo di un antipasto: il bello deve ancora venire: prossimo passo = offensiva economica: Mosca farà sua l’energia ucraina (atomica ed elettrica), l’industria aerea e i cantieri…
- Su tutti i quotidiani italiani le foto del Parlamento ucraino e della rissa scatenatasi ieri, allorché i deputati erano chiamati a gratificare l’accordo sottoscritto dal Presidente filorusso Yanukovich con la Russia: prevede uno sconto sul prezzo del gas del 30 per cento in cambio del prolungamento dell’affitto per la base navale di Sebastopoli, dove staziona la flotta russa, per altri 25 anni dalla scadenza del 2017, cioè fino al 2042. Lanci di uova, fumogeni, colluttazioni, mentre il presidente del Parlamento veniva protetto con degli ombrelli. L’Ucraina ha ottenuto 100 milioni di dollari all’anno per l’affitto della base. E questo – sottolinea La Stampa – ha fornito l’occasione per una differenziazione tra il Presidente Medvedev e il primo ministro Putin. Medvedev: il prezzo è “alto, ma non impossibile”. Putin: per questa somma sarei disposto anche a mangiarmi Yanukovich, nessuna base militare può costare tanto. Segnalato da RASSEGNA ITALIANA, di Ada Pagliarulo e Paolo Martini
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VEDI anche il VIDEO: Ukraine, Russia MPs Approve Black Sea Deal - The Russian and Ukrainian parliaments have ratified a deal that will keep Russia’s Navy based in Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula until 2042, as thousands protested outside Ukraine’s parliament building against the accord. More
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Base contre gaz : en langage clair, cela s’appelle un échange de bons procédés. Moscou et Kiev ont annoncé, mercredi 21 avril, un double accord : l’Ukraine prolonge d’au moins vingt-cinq ans le bail de la flotte russe stationnée à Sébastopol, en Crimée, bail qui devait expirer en 2017 ; de son côté, la Russie réduit d’environ un tiers le prix du gaz qu’elle livre à l’Ukraine. Moscou engrange là tout le bénéfice de l’arrivée au pouvoir, en février à Kiev, du nouveau président ukrainien, Viktor Ianoukovitch, un homme soucieux de mettre fin aux relations tumultueuses avec Moscou qui avaient marqué la présidence de son prédécesseur Viktor Iouchtchenko, considéré comme un ami de l’Occident….
“La situation doit être vue dans le contexte d’une sorte de dégel avec la Russie : le phénomène est perceptible avec les Polonais, avec les Etats-Unis, et avec l’Europe”, dit un diplomate européen. “Avoir de bonnes relations avec les Russes, ou avoir de bonnes relations avec les Européens, cela n’est pas antagoniste, surtout si les relations entre les Russes et les Européens s’améliorent”, assure un autre diplomate. Le compromis entre Moscou et Kiev sur le prix du gaz ne devrait pas, estime-t-on à Bruxelles, remettre en cause l’accord sur la modernisation des infrastructures de transit, négocié en 2009 entre le précédent gouvernement et la Commission européenne, au grand dam de la Russie, qui n’avait pas été associée aux pourparlers. Certains Européens estiment même que Moscou pourrait être associé d’une façon ou d’une autre à la modernisation de ses équipements.
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VEDI la rassegna di European Press Review of 28/04/2010
MAIN FOCUS Russian poker over Black Sea
Amid violent commotion the Ukrainian parliament on Tuesday extended the lease for the stationing of the Russian Black Sea fleet in Crimea until 2042, in exchange for a reduction in gas prices. This gives Russia a dangerous amount of power over its neighbour, some commentators write. Others say the military agreement won’t last long.
Gazeta Wyborcza – Poland – Annexed by Russia – For the daily Gazeta Wyborcza, the huge tumult on Tuesday which accompanied the Ukrainian parliament’s extension of the lease agreement for the Russian Black Sea fleet marks the beginning of the end: “Ukraine is sinking into conflict and internecine war. In such a state it will be difficult to save the country from its economic woes. It will also be difficult for Ukraine to move closer to the EU, although this is really what all the key political forces on the Dnieper are after. Events have shown that the affirmations of the politicians in Kiev are nothing but empty words. Ukraine can move closer to its neighbour Belarus – according to its own wishes. Economically it is so dependent on Russia that it has even adopted Russian standards. The country is incapable of true sovereignty. It’s an open question whether Ukraine wasn’t simply annexed by Russia yesterday. Whatever the answer it certainly took one step in that direction.” (28/04/2010)
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Berliner Zeitung – Germany – Moscow’s carrot-and-stick policy is shortsighted
The controversial military agreement with Ukraine won’t bring Russia many advantages, the left-liberal Berliner Zeitung concludes: “One only needs to look at Belarus’s president Alexander Lukashenko. He has made it his purpose in life to demonstrate to the world his independence from Moscow each day. … Russia has tried without success to integrate its neighbouring country through multilateral organisations. However the labours of multilateralism are not an area in which Moscow excels. The ODKB military alliance exists on paper only. … And so Moscow keeps on trying with bilateral agreements. … The agreement with Kiev is one such successful deal. But even that is not a sure bet. It’s patently obvious that President Viktor Yanukovych wanted to outsmart his country by rushing the deal through the ratification procedure. But this is not the way to form lasting alliances, at least not in a democracy.” (28/04/2010)
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Expansión – Spain – Russian deal affects all Europe
A scuffle broke out among MPs in the Ukrainian parliament during the ratification of an energy and military deal with Russia.The subject is polemic not just in Ukraine but affects all Europe, the business paper Expansión writes: “What happened yesterday in the Kiev parliament illustrates the country’s radical political polarisation, with the one side gravitated towards Russia and now represented by [President Viktor] Yanukovych’s recent election victory, and the other leaning towards the West, which comprises those who voted for [Yulia] Tymoshenko. This Ukrainian issue transcends borders and is central to the stability of Europe’s energy supplies. Ultimately, with this deal on the base in Sevastopol Russia is consolidating its long-term position in the Black Sea and using the energy factor as a vital variable for its strategic capacities.” (28/04/2010)
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The Independent – United Kingdom – Admirably efficient despite smoke bombs
Blows were exchanged in the Ukrainian parliament on Tuesday during a vote on allowing Russia’s Black Sea fleet to remain stationed in Crimea. The British parliament could learn a few lessons from the vote, which ended successfully for the government. “Eggs flew and smoke bombs were detonated. Brawls broke out around the chamber. The speaker, Volodymyr Lytvyn, had to be protected from projectiles by umbrellas. … Rarely has Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is a mere continuation of politics by other means’ seemed quite so close to being literally true. Yet the remarkable thing is that despite the chaos, the debate continued and the legislation that had prompted the battle was even successfully ratified. That’s admirable legislative efficiency in the face of adversity. Who says British politics has nothing to learn from our continental neighbours?” (28/04/2010)
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UCRAINA-RUSSIA: Il flirt Mosca-Kiev preoccupa l’Europa
PRESSEUROP, 28 aprile 2010
… l’avanzata russa in terra ucraina non si limita all’accordo militare-energetico… dall’arrivo al potere di Viktor Ianoukovitch, la lingua russa è sempre più in uso nel paese, nei media e all’università… “nell’era sovietica l’ucraino era una lingua discriminata, che si è riaffermata a poco a poco dopo il crollo dell’Urs. L’espansione dell’informazione russa è l’ultima cosa di cui l’Ucraina ha bisogno”.
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The fleet for gas – Ukraine strengthens its relations with Russia
The extension of the lease for the stationing of Black Sea Fleet in exchange for a reduction in gas prices will result in a further strengthening of the Russian influence on Ukraine and will limit Kiev’s sovereignty in security issues…. Conclusions:

The deal reinforces and perpetuates the presence and influence of Russia in Ukraine. Kiev is de facto limiting its sovereignty in security policy. The chances of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO as a military alliance have been ruled out. The inclusion of Ukraine into the Russian area of security in the coming years is likely to be one of the main goals of Russian security policy. It could manifest itself as pressure on Ukraine’s accession to the Organization of the CIS Collective Security, considered by Russia as a counterweight to NATO.
The agreement could lead to the strengthening of the Russian political, military and economic presence in Crimea. Thus, Russia holds an important instrument of pressure against Ukraine, which can be used should Kiev not agree to perform certain, (from Moscow’s point of view) strategic Russian interests in Ukraine. However, the short-term perspective shows that Russia may be interested in demonstrating the ability to cooperate, which may result in a reduction of the level of political and ethnic tensions in Crimea.
The price of gas after the reduction, comparable with the average European prices, does not solve the problems of the Ukrainian economy, which can be dealt with only through structural reforms. At the same time, reducing the price of gas will improve the situation of public finances in 2010 and the following years.
The immediate beneficiary of the agreement to lower prices is Ukrainian business – the chemical industry in particular, and partly the metallurgy industry. Similar gas prices as in 2009, however, do not give them an advantage over their competitors, and that is why the perspective of those industries will depend on their modernization.
If the draft of the agreement on energy cooperation proposed by the Russian government is finally signed, it will limit the sovereignty of Ukraine’s energy policy and make cooperation with the EU impossible. It seems, however, that due to the interests of Ukrainian business, the position of the negotiators will be tougher and the Russian draft will be modified.
The agreement is Russia’s biggest success in the region in many years. It provides clear confirmation of Moscow’s great possibilities to develop the security situation in Eastern Europe. If the strategic strengthening of Russia’s position in this region is accompanied by a further “washing out” of Western influence, it can be expected that Moscow will gain in confidence and have greater assertiveness against those countries which have so far attempted to pursue a policy independent of Russia in the security sphere (Georgia, partly Moldova).
Combining military issues and economic cooperation in the negotiations and in the agreement legitimizes, in a specific way, Russia’s tactic of using economic pressure to maintain or strengthen its military presence in the CIS and in Eastern Europe.

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Il genocidio di Stalin in Ucraina

Paolo Morawski — Fri, 15 Jan 2010 06:37:21 +0000

Ukraina uznaje Stalina za winnego ludobójstwa
GW, 2010-01-14
Stalin jest winny zbrodni ludobójstwa podczas ukraińskiego Wielkiego Głodu w latach 1932-33 – orzekł w środę sąd apelacyjny w Kijowie. Proces, o który wnioskowała Służba Bezpieczeństwa Ukrainy, rozpoczął się i skończył tego samego dnia. Sąd ogłosił, że ofiarą zbrodni ludobójstwa na Ukrainie padło 3 mln 941 tys. osób. - domanda: queste valutazioni le può emettere un tribunale?
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Yushchenko Praises Guilty Verdict Against Soviet Leaders For Famine
About the great famine in 1933, known among Ukrainians as the ”Holodomor.”
RFE/RL January 14, 2010
KYIV — President Viktor Yushchenko has praised a Ukrainian court ruling that finds former Soviet leaders culpable in the mass famine in Ukraine in 1932-33, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian and Russian services report. The judge declared the case closed after pronouncing the verdict, as all of the defendants are deceased. But Yushchenko said in a statement that today’s ruling is a landmark “that restores historical justice and gives a chance to build Ukraine on fair and democratic principles. At least 3 million Ukrainians are thought to have been died during the famine, which many historians blame on Soviet economic and trade policies. The list of leaders found guilty by the court of organizing “genocide of a Ukrainian ethnic group” and murdering millions of people included Soviet leader Josef Stalin, his close associates Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, Soviet Ukrainian Communist Party officials Pavel Postyshev and Stanislav Kosior, and Ukrainian politicians Vlas Chubar and Mendel Hataevich.” Leggi tutto

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Tra ucraini e russi, la storia

Paolo Morawski — Tue, 26 May 2009 16:23:28 +0000

History And The Politics Of Blame
by Peter Lavelle, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 26, 2009
The past is never really in the past as long as it pervades our present. And recent history is very much with us.
This is why Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has established a commission to protect against “falsification of historical facts and events aimed at damaging Russia’s international prestige.” This move has sparked considerable controversy both in Russia and in Western mainstream media. This is as it should be; history matters.
Medvedev’s history commission is a reaction to the way history, particularly events before, during, and after World War II, is being reinterpreted and even rewritten in a number of post-Soviet and Eastern European states. This approach often undermines, or even denies, the role the Soviet Union played in the defeat of Nazi Germany. In some Baltic republics and Ukraine, Nazi collaborators are even honored as war veterans, while Soviet war memorials are moved or dismantled. Many in Russia consider this not only insulting, but also a dangerous rehabilitation of ideas that their countrymen paid such a high price to eliminate.
The hitherto accepted history of World War II (or the Great Patriotic War, as it is known in Russia) is undergoing revision. This should not surprise anyone; that traditional narrative was a product of the Cold War. The ideological conflict that pitted Soviet developed socialism against Western capitalism resulted in diverging, ideologically couched explanations for the defeat of Nazi Germany.
The Western take was that the Allies, specifically the United States, “saved the world from tyranny in the name of democracy and other liberal values.” Soviet ideologists, by contrast, stressed “the defeat of a murderous and very aggressive ideology: fascism.”
As long as the Cold War continued, these two renditions could coexist, although the West consistently understated the Soviet contribution to Hitler’s defeat. All of this started to change with the self-collapse of the Soviet Union.
Every country and every society needs a common history. National narratives bind a nation together and create a sense of community. All the new sovereign states that came into being with the end of the Soviet Union are very keen to establish new national histories. But in doing so, most of them have to address specific episodes related to World War II.
Warring Histories — As the successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia adheres steadfastly to the belief that it liberated a great swathe of Europe from fascism. To craft what they believe are coherent, if not self-satisfying, national histories, many in the Baltics, Ukraine, and some Eastern European states are challenging Russia’s historical rendition. They claim that not only did the Soviet Union not liberate them from fascism, but that it replaced Nazi Germany as the occupying power.
Embedded in this claim is a double-edged sword. First, those who argue that the Soviets should not be credited with defeating fascism implicitly also deny the role of those in the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe who sacrificed their lives to end Nazi rule. Second, there is also denial about how many Soviet republics, and even Eastern European countries, bowed to Soviet domination, but also benefited from it.
To be sure, there were those who didn’t, and their grievances are legitimate and should be heard. However, history is not as black and white as nationalist historians and governments would like us to believe. For example, I lived in Poland during much of the 1980s when the free trade union Solidarity was enjoying its greatest popularity. At the time, Polish society was polarized; one-third of the population strongly supported Solidarity, and one-third the pro-Moscow regime, while the remaining third waited on the sidelines to see how the standoff between those two would end. And to this day, some Poles still have many good things to say about communist Poland.
What is very disturbing about historical revisionism when it comes to World War II is the attempt to airbrush from the record fascist ideas, groups, and individuals that infested Europe in the 1930s and ’40s. The Cold War-era interpretation of World War II was a convenient opportunity to overlook nasty homegrown fascism all over Europe, particularly in the east.
After the war ended, few wanted to dwell on how fascism and gross right-wing nationalism — very often anti-Semitic — captured the imagination of the European body politic. Political imperatives were far more important, and so confronting the Soviet Union took precedence. It became acceptable to ignore unpleasant episodes.
This is still happening today. Instead of facing up to the sins of the past, it is all too easy to blame contemporary Russia for the real or imagined sins of the Soviet Union. Using this line of argument, Russia can and should claim it, too, was a victim of the Soviet Union.
It is unfortunate that a new discursive pathology has come into vogue. Many feel that the sole way to prove their historical legitimacy and virtue is by casting themselves in the role of victim. This is history gone wrong. All too often a person’s national identity is defined by how someone else wronged him or her.
Today states blame other states for their own problems in the present because of a very specific, and again self-serving, interpretation of what happened in the past. Equally unfortunate is the knee-jerk tendency to blame “undemocratic” Russia for the woes of its neighbors. This is politics on the cheap and a contemptible attitude to what history should really be all about.
Denying the Holocaust is a legal offense in Germany. This is the case in many countries in the world, and is morally right. Consigning to oblivion the murder of millions of people is simply wrong. Russia wants the same to hold true for the 27 million Soviet citizens (at the very least) who gave their lives to defeat Hitler’s murderous regime.
It is a real shame that Russia feels it needs a commission to monitor how others interpret history. History should not be used as a political tool to divide people and countries. In fact, just the opposite should be happening.
Germany and France embarked upon an open and honest discussion to reconcile their long-standing historical differences. What we see now is the opposite: history is being used to divide countries and peoples. These divisions in turn open the door for the worst possibility: the slow but very real rehabilitation of a new form of fascism.
Peter Lavelle is a political commentator for Russia Today television (RT) and is the host of the weekend program “In Context.” The views expressed in this commentary are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RT or RFE/RL

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